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COMMENTS
ARE MANDATORY TRANSPORTATION
CONTROL MEASURES MANDATORY?. A LOOK
AT NINTH CIRCUIT JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT
OF TCMS
I. INTRODUCTION
There is no doubt that the Clean Air Act ("CAA")1 has
prompted our country to make great strides in air pollution
reduction, yet our increasingly transportation-oriented soci-
ety has frustrated the CAA's success.2 Mobile sources, pri-
marily automobiles, account for most of the ozone and carbon
monoxide pollution in urban areas.
3
Transportation Control Measures ("TCMs") are one way
the CAA attempts to reduce emissions from mobile sources.4
The CAA enumerates various TCMs,5 such as programs for
improved public transit, that seek to either reduce or elimi-
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q) (1994). See infra Part III.A.
2. Over 50 million more automobiles are on U.S. highways now than when
the CAA was first promulgated in 1970. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsP. AND U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, CLEAN AIR THROUGH TRANSPORTATION: CHALLENGES IN
MEETING NATIONAL AIR QUALITY STANDARDS (1993) [hereinafter DOT REPORT].
Automobile vehicle miles traveled increased nearly 50% between 1983 and 1990
compared to a 6-9% increase in population in the same period. DOT REPORT at
1.
3. DOT REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(f) (1994). See infra Part III.B.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(f)(1)(A) (1994). TCMs adopted by states may include,
but are not limited to, the following:
(i) programs for improved public transit;
(ii) restriction of certain roads or lanes to, or construction of such
roads or lanes for use by, passenger busses or high occupancy
vehicles;
(iii) employer-based transportation management plans, including
incentives;
(iv) trip-reduction ordinances;
(v) traffic flow improvement programs that achieve emission
reductions;
(vi) fringe and transportation corridor parking facilities serving mul-
tiple occupancy vehicle programs or transit service;
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nate mobile sources.6 However, TCMs have been only mar-
ginally effective in reducing air pollution from mobile
sources.
7
In 1990, Congress amended the CAA to better address
pollution from mobile sources.' While the amendments pro-
vided means to reduce automobile emissions, they loosened
the states' requirements regarding TCMs.9 These amend-
ments effectively de-emphasized the role of TCMs in attain-
ing CAA standards. 10 In 1994, following these amendments,
the Ninth Circuit, in Trustees for Alaska v. Fink, 1 held that a
state's adherence to a TCM that it had adopted was not
mandatory.' 2 Later the same year the court appeared to re-
(vii) programs to limit or restrict vehicle use in downtown areas or
other areas of emission concentration particularly during periods
of peak use;
(viii) programs for the provision of all forms of high-occupancy, shared-
ride services;
(ix) programs to limit portions of road surfaces or certain sections of
the metropolitan area to the use of non-motorized vehicles or pe-
destrian use, both as to time and place;
(x) programs for secure bicycle storage facilities and other facilities,
including bicycle lanes, for the convenience and protection of bi-
cyclists, in both public and private areas;
(xi) programs to control extended idling of vehicles;
(xii) programs to reduce motor vehicle emissions, consistent with sub-
chapter II of this chapter, which are caused by extreme cold start
conditions;
(xiii) employer-sponsored programs to permit flexible work schedules;
(xiv) programs and ordinances to facilitate non-automobile travel, pro-
vision and utilization of mass transit, and to generally reduce the
need for single-occupant vehicle travel, as part of transportation
planning and development efforts of a locality, including pro-
grams and ordinances applicable to new shopping centers, special
events, and other centers of vehicle activity;(xv) programs for new construction and major reconstructions of
paths, tracks or areas solely for the use by pedestrian or other
non-motorized means of transportation when economically feasi-
ble and in the public interest. For purposes of this clause, the
Administrator shall also consult with the Secretary of the Inte-
rior; and
(xvi) programs to encourage the voluntary removal from use and the
marketplace of pre-1980 model year light duty vehicles and pre-
1980 model light duty trucks.
6. See infra Part III.B.
7. See infra Part III.B.
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7 401-7671(q) (1994). See infra Part V.A.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(f) (1994). See infra Part IV.A.
10. See infra Part III.A.
11. 17 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1994).
12. Id. See infra Part III.C.2.
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verse this decision in McCarthy v. Thomas13 by requiring an-
other state to follow the TCM it had adopted. 4 Due in part to
the 1990 amendments and these recent decisions, it is un-
clear just how stringently a state must follow and implement
a TCM that it has adopted.
This comment examines the judicial enforceability of
TCMs once they have been adopted by a state. It begins by
briefly tracing the development of the Clean Air Act, followed
by a consideration of TCMs as a means of attaining the Act's
mandates, and case law interpreting states' commitments to
adopted TCMs.' 5 The comment then analyzes the Ninth Cir-
cuit's treatment of TCMs in the post-1990 CAA amendments
context, concluding that the 1990 amendments and case law
from the Ninth Circuit have reduced the necessity of
mandatory adherence to TCMs.' 6 Further, TCMs are no
longer an effective means of achieving the CAA's goal of re-
duced mobile source air pollution emissions. 7 The comment
thus suggests several alternative approaches that may rein-
state the integrity, and stengthen the enforcement, of
TCMs.' 8
II. IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS
1) Adopted TCMs are binding in order to aid enforcement
of the CAA and further the general goal of increased air qual-
ity.' 9 Situations may arise where changed circumstances
would make implementation of adopted TCMs infeasible or
impractical and where such implementation would not only
be detrimental to the community but would scarcely further
CAA goals.
2) Where the court interprets the CAA to allow flexibility
in one situation, it may inadvertently create a loophole.2 °
This may encourage states to attempt to bypass TCM imple-
mentation through clever State Implementation Plan
("SIP")2' drafting, thereby reducing the CAA's effectiveness.
13. 27 F.3d 1363 (9th Cir. 1994).
14. Id. See infra Part III.C.3.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part V.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part IV.B.3.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 31-37.
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III. BACKGROUND
A. The Clean Air Act
The Clean Air Act emanated from congressional findings
that "the growth in the amount and complexity of air pollu-
tion brought about by urbanization, industrial development,
and the increasing use of motor vehicles, has resulted in
mounting dangers to the public health and welfare .... ,,22
Air pollution is created by both stationary sources 23 and mo-
bile sources. 24 Automobiles are the primary mobile source
that contributes to air pollution. 25 The CAA requires the En-
vironmental Protection Agency ("EPA")26 to establish Na-
tional Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS") to reduce
the levels of certain "criteria" pollutants." The EPA is re-
quired to establish primary and secondary standards for each
criteria pollutant.28 The primary NAAQS is designed to pro-
tect public health by establishing the acceptable concentra-
tion of a pollutant in the ambient air measured over a desig-
nated time.29 The secondary NAAQS is intended to protect
the public welfare by considering environmental and eco-
nomic interests such as soil and water quality, recreational
interest and industrial concerns.3" These standards are to be
enforced by the states, under the direction of the EPA."1
22. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(2) (1994).
23. CAA defines the term "stationary source" generally as "any source of an
air pollutant except those emissions resulting directly from an internal combus-
tion engine for transportation purposes or from a nonroad engine or nonroad
vehicle ...." Id. § 7602(z) (1994).
24. See DOT REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
25. Id. ("[Flor urban areas [mobile source emissions are] estimated at 40 to
50% for hydrocarbons (HC), which combine with oxides of nitrogen (NOx) to
form ozone, 50% for NOx, and 80 to 90% for CO, and they can be higher in some
areas.").
26. The Environmental Protection Agency was created in 1970 as an execu-
tive committee with power to enforce federal environmental legislation and pro-
mulgate regulations to aid enforcement of such legislation. ARTiuR EARL BON.
FIELD & MICHAEL ASIMOW, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1993).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1994). Currently, the EPA has listed six sub-
stances as criteria pollutants: sulfur oxides, carbon monoxide, ozone, nitrogen
oxides and lead. Id. § 7408.
28. Id. § 7409(a).
29. Id. at (b)(1).
30. Id. at (b)(2).
31. Id. § 7410. The major elements required in a State Implementation
Plan include enforceable emission limitations for the criteria pollutants, pro-
grams to monitor ambient air quality, programs to enforce emission limitations,
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To ensure that the NAAQS are enforced, each state must
create a State Implementation Plan.3 2 A SIP is a series of
documents in which a state sets forth plans to implement,
maintain and enforce the NAAQS within the state.33 The
state must submit a SIP to the EPA for approval. 34 If a SIP is
approved by the EPA, it is incorporated as binding federal
regulations.3 5 If a SIP is deficient, and a state fails to correct
the deficiency within a specified period, the EPA may impose
sanctions, including creating it's own plan that establishes
provisions which the state must follow. Such a federally pre-
pared plan is called a Federal Implementation Plan ("FIP").37
The original version of the CAA required a state to follow
the SIP or FIP to meet certain NAAQS within three years of
approval by the EPA.38 After many states failed to attain
some or all of the NAAQS on time, Congress amended the Act
in 1977, providing new deadlines for non-attainment areas.3 9
Under these deadlines, non-attainment states were to amend
their SIPs in order to attain NAAQS "as expeditiously as
practicable." 40 This meant that CAA mandated attainment
by December 31, 1982.41 If a state demonstrated that attain-
ment was not possible by this date "despite the implementa-
tion of all reasonably available measures," the state was re-
quired to submit a second amendment to its SIP whereby the
state's deadline was extended to "not later than December 31,
1987. "42
programs to control source emissions, and evidence of adequate state funding
and authority to implement the plan. Id.
32. Id. at (a).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1). Pursuant to § 7407, each state is divided up into
air quality regions. See id. § 7407.
34. Id. § 7410(a). See also id. at (k).
35. Id. at (a)(2). See, e.g., Delaney v. EPA, 898 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1990), cert
denied, 498 U.S. 998 (1991); McCarthy v. Thomas, 27 F.3d 1363 (9th Cir. 1994).
See also supra Part III.C.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(m). While the sanctions are given to the state, "such
sanctions are not applied on a statewide basis where one or more political sub-
divisions covered by the applicable implementation plan are principally respon-
sible for such deficiency." Id.
37. Id. § 7509(b).
38. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(A).
39. Id. § 7511(a)(1). Non-attainment areas are areas that do not meet the
NAAQS for a particular criteria pollutant. Id. § 7501(2).
40. Id. § 7502(a)(2)(A).
41. Id.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(2) (1994).
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In 1990, after many states had still not attained some or
all of the NAAQS, Congress once again amended the statute,
this time extending attainment deadlines until as late as
2010, depending on "the severity of non-attainment and the
availability and feasibility of pollution control measures."4 3
In 1990, Congress also modified the CAA by expanding the
scope of the motor vehicle inspection and maintenance pro-
gram.4 4 In addition, the amendments pertaining to non-at-
tainment areas specifically require transportation controls to
be implemented.45
B. Role of TCMs
Much attention has been focused on mobile sources of air
pollution.46 Because the CAA cannot directly control the
number of automobiles,4 7 TCMs are available as an indirect
means of controlling mobile source emissions. TCMs cur-
rently listed in the CAA,48 such as programs for improved
public transit, cannot directly control the tailpipe emissions
of automobiles.49 Instead, TCMs are either alternative forms
of transportation that encourage people to drive less fre-
quently or forms of automobile transportation management
that enable people to drive more efficiently. A state can in-
corporate these measures in its effort to comply with the
NAAQS.50
43. Id. at (A). Non-attainment areas are divided into five categories based
on the severity of non-attainment: Marginal, Moderate, Serious, Severe, and
Extreme. The less severe the non-attainment, the sooner attainment must be
met. See 2 SHELDON M. NOVICK, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
§ 11.08[71 (1993) (explaining the distinction between non-attainment areas
categories).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(3) (1994).
45. See NOVICK, supra note 43, § 11.08. Title II of CAA was created by the
1990 amendments to specifically address mobile sources. Id.
46. Id. at [7].
47. See John P. Dwyer, Environmental Federalism: The Practice of Federal-
ism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183 (1992) (discussing Tenth
Amendment barriers to direct federal control of automobile emissions).
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 7408(f)(1)(A) (1994); see also supra note 5.
49. See infra Part III.B.1.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(f).
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1. History of TCMs
One effect of the first CAA amendments in 1977 was to
curtail the use of TCMs.51 Congress was prompted to reduce
the role of TCMs in these early amendments for two reasons.
First, TCMs "were forced to carry a disproportionate burden
of the emissions reductions required to achieve compliance
with NAAQSs."52 Despite the fact that automobiles are the
major source of four of the six criteria pollutants for which
NAAQS were originally promulgated,53 "most states were un-
able to [directly] regulate either fuel economy or tailpipe
emissions of new cars."54 The sole means of controlling auto-
mobile emissions for many states was by implementing
TCMs.55 Since the CAA required states to create SIPs that
would comply with the NAAQS regardless of cost and techno-
logical feasibility,56 states were forced to adopt drastic TCMs
such as gasoline rationing and parking surcharges.57
Second, the drastic TCMs adopted under the original
CAA forced Americans to alter their automobile driving hab-
its. In Los Angeles, for example, adopted TCMs were "in-
tended to reduce vehicle miles traveled by eighty percent.""
Unwilling to implement such drastic measures, some states
resorted to inaction.59 SIPs submitted for EPA approval by
these states did not contain sufficient means to meet the
NAAQS. 60 This forced the EPA to promulgate FIPs in place
of the deficient SIPs.6 1
Congress responded with amendments to the CAA in
1974 and 1977 that restricted the ability of states to imple-
ment TCMs that would drastically alter automobile use.62
However, the amendments fell far short of eliminating TCMs
altogether. Largely because the CAA is a technology forcing
51. Michael T. Donnellan, Comment, Transportation Control Plans Under
1990 Clean Air Act as a Means for Reducing Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 16 VT.
L. REV. 711, 726 (1992).
52. Id. at 736.
53. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
54. Donnellan, supra note 51, at 736.
55. Id.
56. See infra Part III.B.2.
57. Donnellan, supra note 51, at 737.
58. Id. at 733.
59. Id. at 736.
60. Id. at 733.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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statute,63 a rebuttable presumption that all TCMs listed
under § 108(f) are reasonable was established.64 Congress re-
moved this presumption when it amended the CAA in 1990.65
The EPA is now required to prepare information regarding
the TCMs listed under the Act as an encouragement for
states to consider adopting TCMs.6
2. TCM Effectiveness
As required by § 108(f)(3) of the CAA, the Secretary of
Transportation and the Administrator of the EPA submitted
a report to Congress on the effectiveness of TCMs in August,
1993.67 The report surveyed the effectiveness of TCMs that
have already been implemented by states as part of CAA
compliance s.6  The report found that most TCMs produce
small emission reductions:
Recent modeling ... shows that combinations of conges-
tion reduction measures, including highway capacity ex-
pansion, and improvements to ridesharing programs,
transit, and other TCMs, produce only 1 to 2% reductions
in emissions without concomitant travel reduction efforts
such as increased travel costs or restriction and policies to
increase land use density.69
The DOT Report further found that despite implementa-
tion of TCMs, transportation trends indicated that single oc-
cupant vehicles and vehicle miles traveled have been increas-
ing while ridesharing and transit have been decreasing.70
Local control of land use planning, lack of public acceptance
and increasing fiscal restraints also challenge TCM
effectiveness.7 1
A survey prepared as part of the DOT Report found that
almost half of the metropolitan planning organizations stated
63. See infra Part III.B.3.
64. See infra text accompanying notes 89-91.
65. 136 CONG. REC. S16933, S16971 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statements of
Sen. Chafee and Sen. Baucus).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(f) (1994).
67. The report must "review and analyze[ ] existing State and local air qual-
ity-related transportation programs . . . ." Id. at (3)(A).
68. DOT REPORT, supra note 2, at 1. The results of the report generally
cover a two-year period, from promulgation of the 1990 CAA amendments
through the end of fiscal year 1992. Id.
69. Id. at 3.
70. Id. at 37.
71. Id. at 22-23.
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that increased funding would be needed to fully implement
all planned TCMs. 72  In addition, "[n]early one-third re-
sponded that they have a backlog of transportation and air
quality planning activities delayed due to insufficient
funding. 73
The report74 concluded that TCMs are not effective and
that "bletter understanding of the relationships among land
use patterns, travel patterns and air quality will be needed to
respond to the challenge of reducing transportation's contri-
bution to air quality."75
3. Technological Availability
A separate problem concerns the technology available to
implement a particular TCM. In Union Electric Co. v. EPA,76
the Supreme Court affirmed that consideration of technologi-
cal infeasibility should not interfere with CAA's air pollution
reduction goals.77 Union Electric, an electric utility company,
sought review of EPA's approval of a Missouri SIP, arguing
that economic and technological difficulties prevented it from
complying with the SIP.78 In rejecting this plea, the Court
recognized that the state could consider such factors when it
is formulating its SIP.79 However, it held that once a mea-
sure is adopted and approved by the EPA, it is binding and
neither EPA nor appellate court review of an approved plan
can set aside a SIP on grounds of technological or economic
unfeasibility no matter when raised. 0 In so holding, the
Court sent a clear message that economic and technological
72. Id. at 8.
73. Id.
74. The DOT Report was the first such report. required under the CAA. 42
U.S.C. § 7408(f)(3) (1994). This Report warns that it may be too early to ad-
dress whether TCMs will successfully meet the CAA goals because "most states
and local areas around the country are just beginning to develop and implement
transportation plans, projects, and programs to meet their CAA requirements."
DOT REPORT, supra note 2, at 1. The CAA requires the submission of a similar
report on TCM effectiveness every three years. The second report is to be sub-
mitted in 1996. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(f)(3) (1994). At the time this comment was set
for publication, the 1996 report was not available.
75. DOT REPORT, supra note 2 at 23.
76. 427 U.S. 246 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 265.
80. Id. at 265-66.
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feasibility concerns must not frustrate the prompt attain-
ment of CAA's substantive goals.8 1
4. Impracticality
Despite Union Electric, courts may be hard pressed to re-
quire TCMs that are obviously impractical. A federal district
court noted this concern in Citizens for a Better Environment
v. Wilson. 2 The district court held that SIP commitments
made in 1982 were not obviated by the 1990 amendments,
and it ordered the San Francisco Bay Metropolitan Transpor-
tation Commission to identify additional feasible TCMs in or-
der to demonstrate reasonable further progress.8 3 If there
were no additional feasible TCMs available, the burden was
on the Commission to prove this. 4 The court suggested that
it might not require TCM implementation if the Commission
could demonstrate that the TCM was infeasible but admon-
ished that "[nlo court, of course, will require impracticable
measures or measures that cause a substantially dispropor-
tionate hardship for the air quality benefits accrued, regard-
less of the ton per day shortfall. On the other hand, in-
feasibility means more than inconvenience, unpopularity, or
moderate burdens."s
C. The Ninth Circuit's Treatment of TCMs
The Ninth Circuit has had several more opportunities to
consider TCMs than have other circuits.8" As a result, it has
had much influence in shaping the current TCM scheme in
the CAA.
81. Id. at 268-69.
82. 775 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
83. Id. at 1299. Every SIP for a non-attainment area must include enforce-
able measures that provide for reasonable further progress towards attaining
the applicable NAAQS. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(2) (1994). The term "reasonable
further progress" means that a state must make "annual incremental reduc-
tions" in emissions until attainment of NAAQS. This prevents a state from
waiting until just before the final NAAQS compliance date before implementing
SIP requirements. Id. § 7501(1).
84. Citizens for a Better Env't, 775 F. Supp. at 1307.
85. Id. at 1307-08.
86. See infra Part IV.
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1. Delaney v. EPA
In Delaney v. EPA,8 7 the court ordered the EPA to pro-
mulgate a federal implementation plan to replace Arizona's
insufficient SIP. 8 The EPA had designated portions of two
Arizona counties89 as non-attainment areas. 90 Arizona sub-
mitted a SIP to the EPA which was approved subject to cer-
tain conditions, despite the fact that the SIP did not contain
all of the TCMs listed in CAA.9'
When citizens sued, contending that the EPA's decision
to approve Arizona's apparently deficient SIP was arbitrary
and capricious,92 the court looked to EPA guidelines to re-
solve the issue.93 In particular, the court relied on an EPA
guidance document which explicitly stated that each of the
TCM measures listed in CAA § 108(f)94 were presumed rea-
sonably available.95 Further, a state could only reject one of
these measures by showing that the measure either would
not advance attainment, would cause substantial widespread
and long-term adverse impacts, or would take too long to im-
plement.96 The court held that "[t]he EPA must adhere to its
own guidelines."9 7 Thus, Delaney set the stage for mandatory
adherence to listed TCMs when a state prepares a SIP for a
non-attainment area.98
87. 898 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 998 (1991).
88. Id. at 695. The FIP was to utilize all available control measures to at-
tain the carbon monoxide ambient air quality standard as soon as possible. Id.
89. Maricopa and Pima counties contain the cities of Tuscon and Phoenix,
respectively. Id. at 689.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. CAA's citizen suit provision allows a citizen to bring a civil action
against the Administrator of the EPA where "there is alleged a failure ... to
perform any act or duty... which is not discretionary with the Administrator."
42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (1994).
93. Delaney, 898 F.2d at 690-91.
94. See supra note 5.
95. Delaney, 898 F.2d at 678.
96. The document states:
If a state adopts less than all [reasonably available control measures]
and demonstrates (a) that reasonable further progress and attainment
of the [NAAQS] are assured, and (b) that application of all [reasonably
available control measures] would not result in attainment any faster,
then a plan with less than all [reasonably available control measures]
may be approved.
44 Fed. Reg. 20,375 (Apr. 4, 1979).
97. Delaney, 898 F.2d at 693.
98. Id. at 695.
19971
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In response to Delaney, Congress overhauled § 108(f) as
part of the 1990 amendments to the CAA.99 Congress pro-
vided that as part of the State's SIP, each TCM listed in
§ 108(f) need only be considered, not necessarily adopted. 100
2. Trustees for Alaska v. Fink
In Trustees for Alaska v. Fink,10 1 the court determined
whether a state must strictly implement its adopted TCM.10 2
The city of Anchorage, Alaska, devised an air quality plan
that included a plan to expand the mass transit bus fleet.10 3
At that time Anchorage was riding a wave of economic
expansion fueled by the oil industry and the success of the
Trans-Alaska pipeline.' 0 4 Times were so good that the state
legislature abolished personal income taxes and voted to dis-
tribute a "Personal Fund dividend" check of $1,000 to each
resident. 105 In 1982, 86.2% of Alaska's revenue came from the
petroleum industry. 06 During this economic boom, Alaska's
labor force, population and personal income increased faster
than in any other state.10 7 Petroleum income fueled state
spending and "spending for government operations, transfer
payments, loan payments, and public works kept pace with
state revenues."108 The number of automobiles in the
Anchorage areas also increased; this increase strained the
city's transportation infrastructure and contributed to de-
creasing air quality.' 0 9 At the time, expanding the bus
transit system seemed the ideal way to quickly remedy
Anchorage's transportation problems while simultaneously
reducing air pollution in order to meet CAA standards.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(f) (1994).
100. Id. See Novick, supra note 43, § 11.08[7].
101. 17 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1994).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1210. The program included expanding the mass transit bus fleet
and service from 49 busses to between 124 and 161 busses. Id.
104. Anchorage is Alaska's largest city and largest seaport. The discovery of
large fields of oil in Prudoe Bay in 1969 prompted significant economic expan-
sion in Anchorage and Alaska in general, whose economy is primarily based on
defense projects and natural resources, including oil. CLAuSE-M. NAsKE & HER-
MAN E. SLOTMICK, ALAsKA: A HISTORY OF THE 49TH STATE 241 (2nd ed. 1987).
105. Id. at 273.
106. Id. at 272.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 273.
109. Id. at 272.
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By 1986 an economic bust had begun."' As oil prices
dropped, "available state and federal funding shrank and
plummeting oil prices prompted a local exodus, lowered prop-
erty values and decimated tax revenues.""' As a result
Anchorage could not procure the necessary funding to imple-
ment the bus expansion TCM."
2
When it adopted the bus expansion TCM, the city condi-
tioned its commitment to the bus expansion program on fund-
ing becoming available, warning that the gap between ex-
penses and fares must be closed and alternative sources of
revenues uncovered before any expansion could occur.1 3 In
ruling that the city of Anchorage would not be forced to ad-
minister the TCM absent necessary funds, the court looked to
the specific language of the CAA.1
4
Despite the argument that the statutory language 1 5 was
an unambiguous, unconditional command, the court found
that the word "shall" signifies that a commitment must be
made, but the nature of that commitment is left undefined."
6
In assessing the nature of that commitment, the court then
deferred to the EPA's interpretation to allow conditional com-
mitment to a program that had not yet received funding." 7
Further, the court referred to an EPA regulation stating that
"[i]f a particular measure cannot be implemented because the
necessary funds cannot be obtained . . . then the measure
may justifiably be delayed."" 8
Finally, the court recognized that "[a]lthough planning
usually precedes funding, unforeseeable environmental or
economic changes can and do disrupt those plans."" 9 The
court then implied that Anchorage's economic bust was a par-
110. One economist predicted at the time that Alaska's oil boom would be
followed by the most severe depression since the establishment of statehood in
1959. NASKE & SLOTNICK, supra note 104, at 273.
111. Trustees for Alaska v. Fink, 17 F.3d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1994).
112. Id. at 1212-13.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1211.
115. This now obsolete provision stated that a SIP "shall . . . commit the
financial . . . resources necessary to carry out [the TCM]." 42 U.S.C.
§ 7502(b)(7) (1977), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(7) (1994).
116. Trustees for Alaska, 17 F.3d at 1211.
117. Id.
118. Id. (quoting 46 Fed. Reg. 7183 (1981)).
119. Id. at 1211-12.
74319971
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
adigm example of an unforeseeable change that would justify
delay of TCM implementation. 120
3. McCarthy v. Thomas
While Trustees for Alaska apparently carved out an ex-
ception to the strict adherence to an adopted TCM estab-
lished in Delaney, the Ninth Circuit revisited the TCM com-
mitment issue in McCarthy v. Thomas12 1 later that year.122
In McCarthy, Arizona's SIP, which included TCMs for
Pima and Maricopa counties, was never fully approved by the
EPA. "'23 The TCMs included plans to expand the Tucson city
bus fleet by 59 buses (to a total of 199 buses) with ridership of
14.5 million per year by 1986.124 In Maricopa County the
TCM provided for a 400-bus fleet with average daily ridership
of 112,000.125 The state later submitted additional control
strategy proposals after which the EPA fully approved the
SIP.12 However, this EPA approval was vacated by the
Ninth Circuit in Delaney v. EPA.127
The EPA responded by creating a FIP for Pima and Mari-
copa Counties and announced that it would leave intact or re-
approve all measures that were in place in the Arizona SIP
prior to Delaney:
While the Delaney court vacated EPA's approval of the Ar-
izona plans, EPA does not intend, nor does it consider that
the court intended it, to vacate the control measures in
the Maricopa and Pima plans which were previously ap-
proved by EPA. The court set aside EPA's approval of the
plans for failure to include additional measures... rather
than because the measures submitted by the State were
unworthy of approval for their effect in strengthening the
SIP.
128
120. Id. at 1212 ("The [1994] Los Angeles earthquake, with its imminent im-
pact on traffic and transit patterns and state and local budgets, is another para-
digm example.").
121. 27 F.3d 1363 (9th Cir. 1994).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1365. The overall approval of Arizona's SIP was instead condi-
tioned on the correction of deficiencies unrelated to the Maricopa and Tuscon
mass transit bus TCMs. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1365. See infra Part III.C.1.
128. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1366 (citation omitted).
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The appellants sought an injunction requiring Tuscon
and Phoenix to implement the mass transit bus TCMs. 129
The district court dismissed the claims, holding that the mass
transit provisions were not binding because neither the revi-
sions containing these provisions nor any other reference to
mass transit control measures appeared in any final SIP or
FIP.'30 The Ninth Circuit disagreed:
A part of a state's proposal to the EPA that the EPA ap-
proves conditionally (with only minor deficiencies to be
remedied) becomes part of the state's SIP. The EPA need
not include specific reference to the approved provision in
a later notice that purports to make the SIP or FIP com-
plete, in order to include the earlier approved provision in
the federally enforceable plan.1 3 1
Therefore, the court held that the mass transit provi-
sions had become part of the Arizona SIP when the EPA orig-
inally approved them.1 32 Further, the EPA's efforts to comply
with the Delaney order did not disrupt these TCM provisions
and, therefore, they still bind the cities of Tuscon and
Phoenix. 33
D. Indirect Controls and Land-Use Planning
Other provisions in the CAA also affect the enforceability
and effectiveness of TCMs by limiting the ability of the fed-
eral government to directly control mobile sources of air pol-
lution and to directly affect local land-use planning.
Under the CAA, the EPA has no authority to require any
indirect source review' 3 4 as a condition of approval for a
state's SIP. 135 By contrast, the CAA does allow direct control
of mobile sources in certain situations. For example,
§ 182(d)(1)(B) requires employers to implement programs to
reduce the number of miles driven by their employees in "se-
vere areas."'
136
129. Id. at 1367.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1373.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. An indirect source is any facility that attracts mobile sources of pollu-
tion. For example, parking garages and drive-in theaters are indirect sources.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(5)(C) (1994).
135. Id. at (a)(5)(A).
136. Id. § 7511a(d)(1)(B). Interestingly, the California Clean Air Act, CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 39000-44474 (West 1996), contradicts its federal
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In addition, § 131 of CAA expresses the limited nature of
the federal government's involvement in local land-use plan-
ning. 13 7 The notion is that the states are primarily responsi-
ble for their own land-use planning because this is a power
generally reserved to the states. 13  Congress has thus been
careful not to interfere with local land-use planning
decisions.
IV. ANALYSIS
Recent Ninth Circuit cases 39 have interpreted the de-
gree of commitment states must give to TCMs in the wake of
the 1990 amendments. These cases suggest that despite
rather absolute statutory language140 and a reinvigoration of
the role of TCMs, 14 ' enforcement of these TCMs may be on
the decline.142
A. Statutory Language
Section 110 of the CAA states that any SIP must contain
"enforceable ... control measures... as may be necessary or
appropriate to meet the applicable requirements [of the
CAA]."' 43 Thus, any TCMs that are included in a SIP must
be enforceable. To assure that such a measure will be en-
forceable, the CAA requires that a SIP proposal provide "nec-
counterpart on this point. Effective January 6, 1996, state legislation prohibits
a previously required employer-based trip reduction program because such pro-
grams failed to meet the California Clean Air Act objective to reduce mobile
source pollution emmissions by 5% per year. BAY AREA AR QUALITY MANAGE-
MENT DIST., AIR POLLUTION CONTROL OFFICER, PROPOSAL TO BOARD OF DIREC-
TORS (Jan. 5, 1996). The statute removes the requirement that employers spon-
sor trip reduction programs "unless the program is expressly required by
federal law and the elimination of the program will result in the imposition of
federal sanctions." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40929 (West 1996).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 7431 (1994). Congress's desire to limit federal control of lo-
cal land-use planning is also evident in 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(5)(A) (1994), which
states that in considering TCMs, "the State should ensure adequate access to
downtown, other commercial and residential areas and should avoid measures
that increase or relocate emissions and congestion rather than reduce them."
(emphasis added).
138. See Dwyer, supra note 47 (discussing constitutional issues surrounding
federal involvement in local land-use planning).
139. Trustees for Alaska v. Fink, 17 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1994); McCarthy v.
Thomas, 27 F.3d 1363 (9th Cir. 1994).
140. See infra Part IV.A.
141. See supra Part II.A.
142. See, e.g., Trustees for Alaska, 17 F.3d 1209; McCarthy, 27 F.3d 1363.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A) (1994).
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essary assurances that the state... will have adequate per-
sonnel, funding, and authority . . . to carry out such
implementations plan[s]. "
In most cases, the impact of this language is quite clear.
A TCM will not be approved until the conditions of the stat-
ute are met.145 Once approved, a TCM is binding on the
state. 146 However, Trustees for Alaska held that a state could
condition a commitment on funding where there was a good
faith effort to obtain funding despite the statutory
language. 147
B. Interpretation
The Ninth Circuit developed a hard line beginning with
Delaney, holding that the statutory language was unambigu-
ous and absolute. 48 In Delaney, the court held that a SIP
must include all reasonable control measures and that all
TCMs listed in § 108(f) were presumed reasonable unless the
state showed otherwise.' 49 Thus, the court sent a strong
message that states must include reasonably available TCMs
in their SIPs or risk the EPA taking control away by prepar-
ing a FIP to replace the state's deficient SIP.
In response, Congress amended § 108(f) in 1990. The
amended section provides only that a state must consider
such TCMs.' 50 This change signaled a new approach to TCM
enforcement whereby Congress realized that not all TCMs
may effectively promote the goals of CAA for every non-at-
tainment area.' 5 1 The first case to express Congress' implic-
itly softer policy was Trustees for Alaska.
144. Id. at (E). Note that CAA is a technology-forcing statute and does not
require the state to show that such an implementation plan is technologically
feasible. See supra Part III.B.3.
145. 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
146. Id. See, e.g., Delaney v. EPA, 898 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 998 (1990); McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1363.
147. It remains to be seen if other courts would construe the statutory lan-
guage in the same way.
148. See supra Part III.C.1.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 90-92.
150. NovIcK, supra note 43, § 11.08[7].
151. The requirement in 42 U.S.C. § 7408(f) (1994) that a TCM effectiveness
report be prepared every three years evidences congressional awareness of po-
tentially dynamic TCM effectiveness.
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1. Trustees for Alaska
In Trustees for Alaska, the Ninth Circuit parted with the
traditional strict approach of enforcing TCMs by holding that
a state could condition its TCM on obtaining funding.15 2 This
ruling may mark a substantial turning point in judicial en-
forcement of TCM provisions. This new, flexible approach
recognizes that strict adherence to an adopted TCM may un-
duly hinder a municipality without substantially furthering
the air pollution reduction goals of the CAA. Further, the
holding implicitly recognized that permitting Anchorage to
abandon the bus program would not significantly frustrate
the air pollution reduction goals of the CAA. Although not
explicitly stated in the opinion, several factors influenced the
court's holding.
First, the circumstances under which the bus transit
TCM was originally adopted had changed.'5 3 By the time the
case was heard in court, a bus expansion program was not
only financially infeasible but probably unecessary as well.1'5
Even if the court had mandated that Anchorage imple-
ment its bus expansion project, there was no guarantee that
this would reduce mobile source air pollution by reducing the
number of automobiles on the road. The fact that Anchorage
voters failed to approve bond measures or a gasoline tax"5' to
support the bus expansion project strongly suggests that the
project was unpopular. The project's unpopularity is further
supported by the fact that ridership and bus transit service
hours declined.'56 Thus, it was unlikely that a forced bus ex-
pansion would entice people to stop driving their cars and
start riding the bus.
Second, after reevaluating the role of mass transit in
fighting air pollution, Anchorage abandoned the bus expan-
sion program in a new SIP that was concurrently being con-
sidered for approval by the EPA. 55 The new SIP included
152. Trustees for Alaska v. Fink, 17 F.3d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1994). See
supra Part III.C.2.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 103-11.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 107-11.
155. Trustees for Alaska, 17 F.3d at 1212.
156. Id. at 1210.
157. Id. In fact, absent any increased ridership concomitant to the proposed
expansion project, an increase in bus fleet size and service hours would likely
add to mobile source air pollution by placing more vehicles on the road.
158. See supra Part III.C.2.
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other, arguably more effective, measures for reducing air pol-
lution in Anchorage.' 59 In its brief, the city argued that it
could demonstrate compliance with CAA goals without ex-
panding the bus transit program because of these other
measures. 16
0
If the court had mandated that the city implement the
bus program and the EPA had later approved the new SIP
that required no bus program, the city would be stuck with a
fleet of underutilized busses which it could not afford.
16
Such a fleet would at best only marginally further the air pol-
lution reduction goals of the CAA.1
62
Third, in light of the court's holding in Delaney that a
SIP must include all § 108(f) TCMs absent a showing of un-
reasonableness and the subsequent softening of this rule in
the 1990 amendments, 6 3 Anchorage may not have had a
choice when the SIP was approved in 1982. At that time
§ 108(f) required that all listed TCMs, including utilization of
mass transit,16 4 be included in the SIP unless the state could
show that such TCM was unreasonable. 165 The State may
not have been able to show that a bus expansion program was
unreasonable at that time because the oil-driven economic
boom opened sources of private and federal funding.
166
Short of showing unreasonableness, Anchorage included
a condition that the bus expansion program could only be-
come a reality if funding could be obtained.167 The court im-
plicitly recognized that under the currently amended statute,
such a bus system need only be considered, not necessarily
included in the SIP, if other measures were adopted that
would bring the city into CAA attainment. 6 '
159. Alaska's amended SIP, approved by the EPA in February, 1995, specifi-
cally rejected the bus expansion TCM. In its place the amended SIP adopted a
permanent vehicle inspection and maintenance program, a plan to forecast ve-
hicle miles traveled and an oxygenated gas program. 40 C.F.R. § 52 (1995).
160. Appellees' Brief at 15-16, Trustees for Alaska v. Fink, 17 F.3d 1209 (9th
Cir. 1994) (No. 92-36932).
161. See supra text accompanying note 114.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 70-71.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
164. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(f)(xiv) (1994).
165. Id. at (f).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 104-07.
167. See supra text accompanying note 113.
168. See supra Part III.C.2.
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Finally, if Anchorage were forced to implement the bus
program, without first obtaining the proper funding, the debt
would significantly add to the transit authority's operating
deficit. 169 The cost of the bus expansion TCM probably would
only marginally aid the city in meeting its CAA's mandated
attainment.
The court was able to accommodate all of these concerns
because CAA's statutory language does not expressly prevent
a state from conditioning its TCM on funding becoming avail-
able.' 7 ° In fact, the court found that existing language was
ambiguous, and deferred to the EPA's interpretation that al-
lowed for conditional commitments. 17 1
2. McCarthy not in Contradiction
The Ninth Circuit apparently changed its course three
and a half months later by requiring TCM implementation in
McCarthy v. Thomas.172 However, the court's holding173 was
not a regression to pre-Trustees for Alaska enforcement of
adopted TCMs. Trustees for Alaska was not merely an aberra-
tion in the Ninth Circuit's general precedent. While the
court was sympathetic to the city of Anchorage's plea of im-
practicality, no such plea was rendered in McCarthy.'74 In
fact, while at least one commentator feels that McCarthy con-
tradicts Trustees for Alaska,175 the two cases can easily be
distinguished on their facts. 176
In Trustees for Alaska, the city of Anchorage was allowed
to abandon its bus fleet expansion program because the court
was convinced that the city put forth a good faith effort in
169. The transit authority projected an operation deficit of $25,000,000 by
1987. Trustees for Alaska v. Fink, 17 F.3d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1994). An ex-
pansion from 49 busses to between 124 and 161 busses would likely triple the
transit authority's deficit. Id. at 1210.
170. Alan L. Mitchell, Comment, Transportation Planning and the Clean Air
Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 927 (1995).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 114-18.
172. 27 F.3d 1363 (9th Cir. 1994).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 130-33.
174. See supra Part III.C.3.
175. It has been argued that the Trustees for Alaska decision opens a loop-
hole whereby states can avoid or at least defer TCMs that they have adopted by
using conditional language where providing for that TCM. Mitchell, supra note
170, at 929. Thus, the McCarthy decision was in contradiction to that case or at
least was attempting to close an apparent loophole that it had inadvertently
opened in Trustees for Alaska. Id.; see also NOviCK, supra note 43, § 11.08[7].
176. See supra Part III.C.2-3.
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implementing the measure. 177 The city never made an abso-
lute commitment to the bus expansion project. 178 This was
deemed permissible because there was no express statutory
language to the contrary. 179 Language in the SIP warned
that any "local funding requirement makes any provision of
the entire [bus] supply extremely questionable."'8 ° In addi-
tion, the record in that case showed that "available state and
federal funding shrank and plummeting oil prices prompted a
local exodus, lowered property values and decimated tax rev-
enues."'' Thus, the Ninth Circuit in Trustees for Alaska rec-
ognized that "[a]lthough planning usually precedes funding,
unforeseeable environmental or economic changes can and do
disrupt those plans."8 2
The holding in McCarthy reverted to the traditional
mandatory enforcement analysis because the facts differed
widely from those at issue in Trustees for Alaska. In McCar-
thy, there was no evidence that the Arizona cities suffered
any environmental or economic hardship in implementing
the planned bus services.18 3 The state's reason for not imple-
menting the planned services in that case was its belief that
the court's earlier ruling in Delaney" 4 released the State
from the obligation to implement any of the provisions in that
SIP.'8 5 Nowhere in the subsequent, revised SIP and the
EPA's federal implementation plan was the bus transit TCM
specifically included.' 8 6 Therefore, the State rationalized
that it no longer was obligated to implement the bus sys-
tem.' 87 The Ninth Circuit, however, was convinced that the
State was bound by its TCM because it was approved when
the EPA conditionally approved the State's SIP.' 8  When the
conditional approval was vacated by the court, it was the ap-
177. Trustees for Alaska v. Fink, 17 F.3d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1994).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1211.
180. Id. at 1212.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1211-12.
183. McCarthy v. Thomas, 27 F.3d 1363 (9th Cir. 1994).
184. See supra Parts III.C.1, IV.B.
185. Delaney v. EPA, 898 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 998
(1991).
186. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1363.
187. Id. at 1367.
188. See supra text accompanying note 128.
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proval of those conditions that was vacated, not the previ-
ously approved TCM. i s9
In other words, the Ninth Circuit required Arizona to im-
plement its TCM because it had previously been approved
and the state showed no good faith reason why it could not
implement the measure. This is a different situation from
that in Trustees for Alaska, where the Ninth Circuit allowed
the state to abandon its TCM because it made a good faith
showing that the measure could not be accomplished.
The Ninth Circuit has thus created a precedent of flexi-
bility for cities which cannot make a TCM work and where
the goals of the CAA will not be significantly frustrated.
However, it will not allow states to simply renege on their
commitments and frustrate the goals of CAA just because the
measure is inconvenient, unpopular, or creates a moderate
burden.190
3. Potential Abuse of the Ninth Circuit's Flexibility
It has been suggested that the Trustees for Alaska deci-
sion creates a loophole open to abuse by municipalities that
do not intend to carry through with their commitments. 191 If
a state can condition its TCM commitment on obtaining fund-
ing, it may be able to indefinitely delay implementation of
that TCM.192 Such abuse would likely subvert the CAA's
goals. 193
Although allowing a state to make a conditional commit-
ment to a TCM may make it easier to convince a court that
the state should be exonerated of its commitment when that
condition is not met, such a condition will not convince a
189. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1366. See Edward P. Murphy, Comment, McCar-
thy v. Thomas: Are States Bound When Approval of an SIP is Merely Condi-
tional?, 25 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 249 (1995).
190. See supra text accompanying note 85.
191. Mitchell, supra note 170, at 945-46.
192. While the Ninth Circuit has recognized the ability of a state to condition
its implementation of a particular TCM on obtaining funding, the court stops
short of releasing the state's obligation to implement the TCM outright. Id. at
940-43.
193. Where a TCM is an integral part of a state's overall plan to meet
NAAQS by a particular date, a significant delay in the implementation of that
TCM may cause the state to fail to meet the NAAQS by the requisite date. If
such a delay is judicially justified, such justification would render the air pollu-
tion reduction goals of the CAA toothless.
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court by itself... Even if a state conditions its commitment,
it still must show that it made a good faith effort to satisfy
that condition. Such a showing could be made by evidencing
reasonable steps towards TCM implementation similar to the
steps taken by the city of Anchorage in Trustees for Alaska.'95
Any potential loophole is small indeed. A conditional
commitment by itself will not frustrate the purpose of the
CAA 196 since a state must still pass the good faith effort stan-
dard in order to delay the implementation of that
commitment.
197
V. PROPOSAL
Trustees for Alaska represents a shift away from the
Ninth Circuit's strict approach to TCM compliance estab-
lished in the Delaney decision. 9 ' The new, flexible approach
recognizes that TCMs are not as effective in furthering the
CAA's air pollution reduction goals as previously believed.
Further, it allows some leniency where draconian TCM en-
forcement would be an undue burden. The court could not be
so flexible with Arizona in the McCarthy case because the
municipalities made no effort to implement the TCM, let
alone a good faith effort.' 99
1. Retain Good Faith Standard
The court should retain the flexible good faith effort stan-
dard when presented with a TCM commitment conditioned
on funding. This will enable states to delay the implementa-
tion of TCMs upon a good faith showing of extreme detrimen-
tal circumstances. 20 0 However, in interpreting a statute, the
194. One commentator suggests that a conditional commitment is separate
from a good faith effort, and that by condoning the permissibility of conditional
commitments, the ninth Circuit has given a state the power to pick and choose
which TCMs to implement, thereby subverting the CAA's goal of improving air
quality. See Mitchell, supra note 170, at 945.
195. See Trustees for Alaska v. Fink, 17 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1994).
196. See supra Part III.A.
197. Presumably, an unreasonable conditional commitment would preclude
a state from later showing that it made a good faith effort to satisfy that condi-
tion. For example, if Anchorage had conditioned its TCM commitment on the
sky falling, it could not show that it made a reasonable, good faith effort to
satisfy the condition because the condition itself is unreasonable.
198. See supra Part IV.B.1.
199. See supra Part III.C.3.
200. See Trustees for Alaska, 17 F.3d at 1211 n.4.
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court can only go so far before it is in effect creating law and
treading in the realm of the legislature, something it may not
do.20 1 By allowing a state to delay TCM implementation, pos-
sibly indefinitely, the court is in effect relieving the state of
its duty to implement a mandatory TCM. Such a reading
comes precariously close to law-making.202
2. Agency Clarification
To avoid judicial legislation, close any potential loopholes
created by prior court decisions, and prevent the courts from
having to decide whether the goals of the CAA are or are not
being frustrated, the EPA should promulgate regulations
that clarify the ambiguity surrounding TCM implementation
policy. The regulations should explicitly adopt the good faith
standard used in Trustees for Alaska, as well as provide an
illustrative list of circumstances 203 that would justify delay of
TCM implementation. Such a regulation may state:
(a) A TCM adopted as part of a SIP that was approved by
the EPA prior to 1990 must be implemented unless the
state has made good faith efforts to implement that TCM
and subsequently demonstrates that such TCM is
unreasonable.
(b) In assessing the reasonableness of any particular
TCM, the TCM is presumed reasonable unless demon-
strated otherwise by the state.
201. A basic principle of constitutional law is that there is a separation of
powers between the three branches of government: executive, judicial and leg-
islative. Therefore, a judicial body may not, generally speaking, create law
thereby performing the role of the legislature. For more discussion of the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine, see, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw Ch.
6 (12th ed. 1991).
202. Another problem with statutory interpretation, such as that in Trustees
for Alaska, is that interpretation allows the court to decide when the goals of
CAA should be frustrated in order to serve justice to the complaining state.
Such a decision should only rest with a political body that can take an accurate
pulse of what the public thinks is admissible to frustrate the goals of the CAA-
the legislature.
203. Federal regulations currently allow for delay of TCM implementation
where necessary funding is not available. See supra note 116 and accompany-
ing text. Legislative history suggests delay is also justified where TCMs are not
reasonably available due to extraordinarily high economic or social cost. S.
Rep. No. 127, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 40 (1977). Unforeseeable environmental or
economic changes in the community may also justify delay of TCM implementa-
tion, especially where the community's primary economic base collapses or
there is a major earthquake. Trustees for Alaska v. Fink, 17 F.3d 1209, 1212
(9th Cir. 1994). See supra text accompanying notes 119-20.
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Such a statute would not only give states guidance if
they run into problems in implementing their adopted TCMs,
but would also give states much-needed guidance when decid-
ing whether or not to adopt a given TCM. Further, such a
regulation closes the door to potential abuse by states which
would rather not implement an adopted TCM because of in-
convenience or unpopularity.
3. Congressional Clarification
If the EPA is uncomfortable creating a standard by
which to hold states accountable for TCM implementation, a
similar provision, if enacted by Congress, would enhance the
enforceability of TCM implementation and strengthen the
goals of the CAA. The EPA would then be free to create regu-
lations futher addressing this provision.
Inclusion of such a provision in the CAA may be an espe-
cially timely move for Congress to make. The last amend-
ments were in 1990.204 It is now 1996 and changes may be
near. Inclusion of a provision addressing TCM implementa-
tion enforcement would clarify the ambiguity that has arisen
in the Ninth Circuit.
4. Shift Enforcement Focus
An alternative approach would be for Congress and the
EPA to concentrate their CAA efforts on direct pollution re-
duction controls such as the vehicle maintenance and zero
emission vehicle programs, rather than on indirect TCMs.2 °5
While CAA's air pollution reduction scheme has worked well
for emissions from stationary sources, reduction of air pollu-
tion from mobile sources has been less successful. Such an
approach, while not directly resolving the TCM enforcement
ambiguity addressed in this comment, is supported by the
1993 DOT Report's finding that automobiles are becoming an
increasingly large source of air pollutants addressed by the
CAA. 2 0 6
204. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q) (1994).
205. Many TCMs, such as mass transit programs, only indirectly control mo-
bile sources by attempting to create an incentive to reduce those sources. Such
TCMs have not been effective because the CAA does not authorize related nec-
essary direct mobile source regulation or land use controls. See supra Part
III.D.
206. See DOT REPORT, supra note 2.
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While TCMs are an essential part of CAA's overall mo-
bile source air pollution prevention scheme, municipalities
should not be bound by commitments to such TCMs when the
EPA has deemed them ineffective and/or the municipality
adopts an alternative provision that, given fiscal circum-
stances, will better further the air pollution reduction goals of
the CAA.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit recognized in Trustees for Alaska that
TCM enforcement can be flexible where justice requires it.
The apparently contrary ruling in McCarthy later the same
year 20 7 evidences the court's reluctance to go too far toward
creating new law, a job reserved to legislators.
These cases not only emphasize the ambiguity surround-
ing the standard to which states will be held regarding feder-
ally binding TCMs, but also suggest that the court is ready to
alleviate TCM obligations through liberal interpretation
where justice demands. This approach may encourage states
seeking to abandon their adopted TCMs to search for loop-
holes in the statute, thereby subverting the CAA's substan-
tive air pollution reduction goals.
While the court does not go so far as to entirely excuse a
TCM requirement and, in doing so, completely undermine the
CAA's purpose, Congress and the EPA should take affirma-
tive steps through regulations and/or statutes to reinstate the
vigor of TCMs and, thereby, the vigor of the CAA.
Geoffrey E. Bishop
207. See supra Part III.C.3.
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